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LAWS.

The Saxon Iings by virtue of thoqoyal
occasionally granted relief in tios
remedy in the conrts.

Williae

ore also Eranted relief

in

the sme ianner.

I

rerogative

dases.which were without
and his irinediates success-

llh. cases and in

substantially

But the exercise of this judicial prerog-

ative gradually becoming burdensome to the kings was frequently delegated

to the chancellor or other court officers.

1ntil
Edward III in the twenty-second year of his reign ordered that"all. seh natters as were of Grace should be referred
to and dispatched by the Chancellor or the keeper of the
Privy Beal"and thereby establisaan equity court.

Which

despite vigorous attacks at times has stood through the sueeeeding centuries aiding in.the developuent bf a rapidly expanding c@buntry and ofefctually neeting the needs of an advancing eciilization.

It is probable that for some time

prior to the establishment of.a court of equity mistake was
one groumdfor the exercise of the king's judicial power.
It is stated by a recent writer that, IrFrom the timte when
Jurlsdiction was TjorMally delegated to the chancellor by the
crown, mistake has I'a*-oyd a ilost important Vart as the

coas-

ion of equitablo riChts and duties

r1

for thu oxerclse of
In the earlier

3insdietion in awarding equitable ro-erdios.

periods, when the deolmlA:S of the law courts ai,.d the court of
the cori.Cr. law

ehancery were sharply diT.-en

Judges were not influenced by equitable nations, this branch
of equitable jurisprudence and jurisdiction consisted entirely in the means by which certain iarties were irevented from
holding and enjoying legal rights and certain other parties
were relieved fxom the birden of legal duties and liabilities,
which 'had originated under a uistake and which were complete
In

and unassailable at law.

the progress of time as the

eonron lakw became more and more conformed to equitable prinelples, the leral tribunals assuried a partial cognizance and
gave a partial relief in cases involving mistake. "(a)
A eomyrehensive dIefinition of mistake is the one give by
Prof. Pmeroy:

"'12ist ae,

therefore,

within the

equity and as the occasion of jurisdiction,
mental condition,

ioaing of

is.an erroneous

conceptln, or conviction i,,duced by ig-

norance 1 isa-prehension, or

misunderstanding of the truth,,

but without negligenco, and resulting in soiie act or omipion$j
done or suffered erroneously by one or both of tie' parties to
a transaction, but without its
(a)

Pormercy on fquity Jtrirude.ce

o'ronleos character being inZoc. O 3.

tended or known at the timo.*(a)
however that the words
been inserted for all

It

seems mnecessary

"but without negligence" should have
o1.thc oquitablo riaxims al;l, y as a

matter of course and "tquity aids the vigilant" is
ularly applicable.

partie-

Indeod raost oases of mistake are oases

in which the ignorance, misapprehension or misunderstanding
of the truth is due in some degree to negligence.

There.can

be no doubt thqt courts will not relieve a Darty from

,his

mitake if they deem that he ws negligent but it certainly
is

true that not all

deemed negligent.

acts dohe or omissions suffered are
It is

also certain that no court will

degree relief unless the mIstake Is tnaterial and is shown by
the mst clear and convincing proof.

In the dollowing dis-

oussion only mistakes made by a party or parties to an agreement are considered.

A mistake may be imaterial because

It is of so little tportance that the rights of parties of
parties are practically the sane in law whether or not reformation is decreed or when the loss to the aggrieved party
is so inconsiderable that the coirt will not consider the
matter.
4A the ease of Rue v Ueirs, 43 N.J.Zq. 377, it was sought
t ,tive-'tho eourt Jurisdiction by asking a reformation Of
(Rt)

Poneroy on Equity Jurinionce, GOO.8M.

the Instrment bocause the words 1"arty

part I

of the first

were used where clearly the words "iVarty.of the secon

Part"

The Now Jersey couitt refused to take juis-

were intended.

dietion on the grrand that the mistake was immatorial and
that it

did no injury.

The court said,

"But these mistakes

are palpable and do not create the slightest obscurity as to
the maning of the contract,

nor prevent

it

from being so

eonstrued as to give full effect to the real intention of
It is a rule of construction of universal apili-

parties.

eatiox, that a contract notwithstanding mistakes therein
shall If

the

maeaning of the martios 'Lo clarly

discerrod be

construed as near the nind and al,1arent intent of the partis
as It possibly nay be, and the law will permit.
seq1ient parts o
parties In
must in

its

The sub-

this contract express the intention of the

language so clear,

siuple and exilicit

that it

1resent form be izderstood and construed Just

exactly as it would be afiter it. was reformed.

Where that is

the case reformation can aoo-z1lJ4.sh nothing ........

A imistake

which is harmless and does no Injury needs no correction.
"iis court cannot take Jurisdiction on theotrourzd."
A Virginia
10 Lee 3,

.de

observed in

the

ase of Weaver v Carter,

"IHence our courts have wisely said that even in

by the acre :w coia. nation is

sales strictly

to be made for

or of

to arise merely from tho variations of instruments
mensurat ion.

resumed

b
oe

defieiency where the su?-?osed dIefiait Iay fairly

I

because it

A mistake also nay le iiaterial
ly enough connectod with th

is

not *lose-

stbjeat natter of the contract to

be deemed the turning point in the transaction.

Unless it

is a mistake as to a necessary and intrinsic fact deemed
regardless alike

material by the courts they grant no relief:

of how m-h a party may lose by his mistake or how much he
has dended upon the suni-osed state of facts in nrakirZ his
contract.

The ease of Daerbann v Sehulting,,

75 N.Y¥.

55 is

The defendant being insolvent was about to assign
in point.
advanced hin $I0,00O. upon condition that he
when the plaintiff

shbculd be under no legal obligation to repay it providing he
paid the amount already due Ilaintiff in full.

The release

given at the time contrary to the intention of the parties
was of no force.

Subsequently the defendant who was then

able to Pay his debt in full

al.od the plaiItiff

a valid release upon payment of 1,Co
the proposition and did as requested.

.

to give him

PlaintifL

accepted

Thts action was

brought to cancel the release that the other "5OCO.

might be

reeovered.

The groMuids alleged were fraud

ad mistake.

eourt caa-e to the conclusion that there had beon
as to the mistake the court saird,
*It is

Uarl J,

further clanied that the plaintiff

to relief on account of mistake.
not have executed the release, if
financial condition.

t-o

The

fraud and

writing the opinio;f,
oueht to be entitled

lie testified that he would
lie had known the defenda;,t's

But as already shown, the defendant

was In no way responsible for his ignorance ar.d was under no
legal or equitable obligation to disclose the facts as to his
pecunlary circmistarices.

The pVlaintiff could have learned

the facts by inquiry of the defendant or his vendees.

There

was no Piistakle an to any fact intrinsic td the release.
Plaintiff knew that the 4,ofendant had rot beem legally diesharged from his liability and for that the V5o00.

he was to

give hin an absolute release and he gave hi. just such a release as he Intended to.

There was no z-.istake of any in-

trinsic fact essential to the contract or involved therein.
The defendant's financial condition was an extrinsic fact
which xight have influenced the plaintiff's action if he had
kxown it.

But ignorance of or mistp-7o as to such a &act is

Not ground for affirriative equitable relief."
It was said by :.r. Justice Swayne in the case of Gryxes v

Sanders,

ot.

al. O

U.S.

in

fact, to warrant relief
fact must be seh

that it

duet of the party.

55,

'tA ,:istake as to a hiatter of

equity iaxst be r-aterial and the
anir-ated and oontrolled the con-

It nust go to the essence of the object

The court must be satim view, and not be rt:erely incidental.
that
isfied Abut for the zistake the coRi4lainant would not have
assumed the obligaticn from which he seeks to be relieved."
There is

no exception to the rule that a i:.ista:.e raist be

material affectin

the suobstance of a transaction or the

eourts will refuse jiursdiction.
It

is

also laid down in

a general way that a mistake

must be mutual or the courts will not take cognizance of the
mtter.

But this rule refers

aore particularly to those

eases where reformation is sought.

By this remedy an irnper-

feet instrument is made to speak the contract of the parties
thereby making it

possible to enforce the agreement at law.

It is plain that when a reformation is decreed the mistake
mus

be shown to have been nutual otherwise courts would be

engaged in making contracts for parties which they never intended-and enforcing rights and granting, re.edlies on a so
called. acreezen-O whiah Lhy ;ever made.

The courts seem to

make no distinction between cases in which the draughtsman

=*es a mistake and the parties,have no ehance to correct it
and those cases in which the iritiie
aid they make the same mistake.

is read by the parttes

in either event aeoording

to legal interpretation it is a mutual uistake.
There is a class of cases however In which refornation
is decreed where elearly there has beon actual raistake b)i
only one party to the atroozient.

These are those eases in

which the party has been guilty of fraud and because of his
frauid he is
ral axe.
the

estoyped fron danying that the mistake was a mutThe eourts .holding hisas is jlerfectly just., to

ontraet which he fraudulently led the other party to

suppose was beilg made.
Is the somewa
3lO,

peculiar case of Rider v Paoill,

28 N.Y.

the Judge who wrote the prevailing. opinion seemed to

have givent this subject but little
incorret statement of law.

eonsideration and made ax

In the dissenting opinion a

correct statement was made as to reformation and recissiON
but the judge might have gone farther and reeoanized the fast
that

ourts sometimes decree reformatio

one side.

ix cases of fraud ox

The plaintiff desired the reformation of a bond

which provided for payment in amnual instaluents of *3000.
with Interest only o eaeh instalment. as it became due ratter

than on th* whole,

am remaining unpaid as the trial

found was agreed between the parties.
the opinion of the eourt said, '
judged ease,

in whlh it

Judge

Baloon &. who wrote
not aware of any ad-

a

has been held that there must be

C mutual mistake of fast by the parties to a written contrast
or some fraud on the part of the party not mistaken to extitled

thi

party who made the mistake axd who suffered by it,

to have such contract reformed so that it

will truly express

the oral agreement of the parties which was to be earried
Into effect by tbe; written scntreaet and sueh a docetrine
would be coutrary to goad sense and soud priniple.

It

was

said by Mr. fustice Wright in the dissenting opinion, "A mistoe by the plaintiff

When he made the cotrast

Interest he was to reeeive
not entitle

as to the

ox the band and mortgage would

him to have the contract so modified as to eoxform

tO hls mistaken impression though it nIght be a ground for
rgsinding the contract on the ground that the minds of the
parties never met in making it.t
finally the rule of judrment In

The reeord states *And
favor of the plaintiff

was

eonstrued as a finding of the r.ecessary facts viz, fraud or
mistake of fact on the part of defendant.
of affirmance wext upon that theory.

And the judgment

Ix.a similar ease the appellate court concluded that two
moted did x~t eomform to the agroertent between the parties is
The Judge who delivered

that they did not bear interest.

the apiniox referring to Rider v Powell, supra, said, " hile
the ground upon which the decasion was put, there being in
the ease so finding of fact Is doibtless untenable, the priaeiple asserted In the delsion is
It

is

that where a party who is

clearly right and sound.

to execute papers in edxsu-

mating a eoxtraet draws, or causes or procures them to be
drmam erroxeously, and

alas or puts them off upox the

oppmsite party ix that shape without apprising him of the
errr

or alteration, he comutts a fraud, and relief In equity

Is reforvirZ the instrument may be had on the grourd either
of mistake or fraud."
The other equitable ren-edies decreed to relieve parties
from the effeets of. their mistakes are rescission aAd cancellatica; these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, beeause the remedies .are practically the same.

But teelmieally

speaking cancellation is decreed When a reformation tAght
haye been had I.e. when there was a rutual mistake or a mistake on oe side with fraud on the other.
deereed inall other cases.

And rescissiou is

It Is never necessary to show a

mutual mistake in order that the court i.ay rescii-cd the cotrtract.

A and B enter into tr. agroee:or.t,

tain described

cer-

A to trasfer

to D and B to build A a storehouse.

A

made a mistake as to the anount of land he aereed to transfer
and B was mistaken as to the locaticr, of the storehouse. 1aeh
was mistaker as to a material fact and yet there certainly
In the hypothetical case above

was xot a mutual nistake.

stated before either party had acted upon the agreement,

at

the request of either equity w'tould decree a resoissiox.
if the parties could Yot be placed in

stat~u qlyo,-

if

But

either

would be substaxtially damaged by a resoissiomthe law would
enforce the contract as it
been made.

In

appeared by the instriuiont to have

such oases equity would refuse jurisdiction

ix aceordaxce with the maxim "Maore the equities are equal
the law shall prevail."

If

however-A only was itistakeon and

he alone had acted on the agreement and made a transfer of
his land equity would listen to his prayer and decree a rescissiox of the deed.
This is

the diotta of a Rhode Isla,.cd judge,

the power to reform a writing so as to Aahe it

"But besides

express the

agreement of both parties as it was designed to do a court of
equity has also

to ios~cid and cancel an. agreenent at

the request of one party, upon the -round that, without ro&ligenee, he entered into it throu h a nistake of fact raretial
to the contrast,

when he ean do so without injustice to the

other party."
Owint to the reluctance of the courts to base a decisiol

any other rround cax be found and

on the ground of mistake if

to the fact that wher. the case is not tainted with fraud the
parties are usually willing to settle it out of court; the
great majority of cases in which reseission lias been decreed
are cases in which fraud plays soixe part.

But the undoubted

right remains Ix equity to rescind awy agroement under the
limitations xotieed if mistake is clearly shown.
Yin.ta}le IE divided into tra Creat alaires.
take is

one of law or

f

lalt.

Every mis-

A ristake of fact in

defined

in the California Civil Code, Too. 1577 In the following
manner: "A rlistaka of feet is a mistake not caused by the
neglect of a legal duty on the piart of the person making the
mistake and consisting in: first,
forgetfullness of a f-ot,

,

an unconscious ignorazce or
or present, material to the.

oantraot:or, second, belief in the -,resont existence of a
thim material to tie

contract which does not exist, or in

the past existhad o'

s'u1&i a tiig which *-Aas not existed."

The eases are nmierous rhich hold that nistake as to
matters of fact are always ground for relief.

"The cases

found on mistake seem to rest on t his principle: that if
Jelieving that a certain state of things exist, come

'

:artio

to an agreement with such l'ellef for its
ing their mutual error,
rights

(a).

basis, on discover-

they are remitted to their original

A mistake as to foreign law is

mistake of fact.(b}

*It is

considered a

an elementary principle that,

money 'paid IMder a mistako of taterial
party raying derives no benefit,

facts, where the

ray be recovered back."(Co)

MIstake of law may be dofined an arn erroneous conclusion
as to the legal effect of known facts.

One of the great

mazitns of El~lish and AxaericaL law is;, "Ignorantia juris
excusat."

For this 1rinc 1le

debted to the Romans.

It

Is

's

non

for many others we are in-

obvious that If

ignorance of

the law ras allowed as a sufficient excuse for breaking a
contraot parties would practically have their op*ion as to
whether they would break it or-not.

And it is impossible to-

forsee all the consequences which would result from allowing
men to avoid their afroomeWtS and annul their contracts,
the plea that they did not understand the law.

onxt-

Soe able

judges have hold that this maxim oltly ap-lies to orimlnal,' .
(a) Mwratt v Wright., I Wend.356;(b) See 9 Pickering 111.
(cia
SBarb.223, se( also 25 N.Y.239.

In Cooper v Phibbs, L.R. 2 H.L. 140, Lord Westbury

cases.

said, WIt to said lignorantia juris haud excusat', but in
is

that maxim the '!us'

the sense of denoting general

ured in

But when the word jus

law the ordinary law of the country.

is used in the sense of denotirg pLrivato right tbh

maxim has

no apmlieation.w
In

the case of Chamilin v Laytin, I Edw.

Ch.467,

the

Jndge after ueferring to several cases which did not fully
sustain hls position said, "I think these causes are muffiolent to establish the correctness of the position, that a
contract entered into under a mutual misconception of l.gal
rights, amunting to a mistake of law in both theoontraoting
parties by which the objeoct and

Ing

tjs

inytt

Rnd nMAjRiM,,j

.d

of their contract accord-

c~ulat,

be :1coomplished, Is -as

liable to be Set aside or roscinded as a contract founded In

utstae

of matters Of fact.

to grant relief

in

t-ej

This aairt has te

one as in

the other."

same jower
This case was

stwtained by the highest court but as distinctly stated not
on the ground of mistake of law.
wrote the opinion said,
ousat is

'The maxin,

Ur Justice Bronson who
ignorantia legis non e.-

untformiy aiplied in the administration of criminal

laws, and I

m at a loss to conceive why the fi tness of the

ruile should ever havo been doubted in
In

civil casos."(a)

the 1jarticular case just referred to, the decision was

not placed on the Projer ground in the lower court and the
statement made by the vice chancellor was too broad to be
sustained by the weight of authority.
doubt that thore arI
cases.

For in

There.

is

however no

ontLe excotions to the rule in

civil

the best considered modern decisions it

been laid down that there may be relief

has

on the grond of mis-

take induced by ignorance or mistake of law pure and s5ipe.(b)
1istakes of law may be divided into two classes, 1. Those
mztakes made by a party entering into a contract in regard
to his own anteceodont existing legal rights although he knowthe full

legal effect of the present transaction;

mistakes made by a party as to the legal
action in Which he is

2.

Those

of a trans-

about to engage although he has full

knowledge as to all of his ikrior existing lgal rights and
readies.

An excellent illustration of the first class of

mistakes is the much criticlsed case of Lansdown v Lansdown,
I Mosely's Reortr 3C3.
as follows.

The whole case as there reported is

There were four brothers, the second died, and

the eldest brother enters

(a) 18 Tend. 407. Rt T..

upon his lands,

412.

the youngest

brother claims a title, upon which they appy to Hugher a
schoolmaster, their neighbor in th' -,at.;try (who

cted as an

attorneyl for hio opiniAon, who ui.on conmilting a book called
The Clerk's 1Remenbrancer, gav

it in favor of the youngest

brother, because lands could not ascend; upon which the eldest brother agreed to d4-

the estate with the youngest and

declared he would rather 6o so, thei go to law, though he had
the right:

Ujon which ,:r. Lughes prepred deeds of lease

and release of the moiety, which -rore executed by the eldest
brother, and bonds for the -enalty of 30, It whiah was corrputed to be the value of the moiety, conditioned for the
qviet enjoyment of their respect ive shares; the youngest
brother died and the moiety descended or. the defendant, the
infant, hi

son and heir:

And thi Lord Chancellor decreed

that the bond and deeds of leane and release, should be
delivered up to the jilpintiff, the eldest brother, being obtained by mistake and

Aisrepresentation and that the defendant

the infant, when he oavao of age should convey nisi, &

and

his lordshij said, That mnaxim of law, Ignor~ntia Juris non
ex~crat ras in regard to th

public,

that ignorance cannot be

pleaded in excuse of crines, but did not hold in

civil cases?

Probably no court would go further than w.s done in this

ease but there is a growing tendency to grant relief in cases
of this class, some courts construing the mistake as one of
fact and others squarely holding that they would relieve
parties frOM the effects of such mirtakes of Jaw.
The second class of cases is

illustrated by the widely

cited case of HUnt v Roufuzaniere's Adm.,

I Peters 1.

In

almost every case of mistake arising in the United States
since this one was decided either one party or the other has
found occasion to refer to it.
have found it useful.

And sometimes both sides

An Ohio jiyge said of the case, "It is

cited by both the partnes in

this

case to show that equity

will and will not relieve against a mistake of law merely.1t(a)
The fact that the case was twice before the 3ureme Court of
the United

I~4probably largely accounts for such a use of

it.
These are the essential facts of the case.

The con-

plainant lent money to the defendant's Intestate and after
taking the advice of counsel decided to take security in the
form of an irrevocable power of attorney to sell certain vessls

and apply the proceeds to the debt.

The case was first

before the court on an wpl.eal from a decree sustaining a demmrrer and dismissing the bill.
(a

1!c Naihgten et.al.

In reversing the decree of

v Partrirce ot.al.,li

Ohio Z25

th1e Circult Court,
Marz'x.1t

the Supreme Court said; i:r. Chief Justice

delivering the ol!Anon,

"We

find no case which we

thirk precisely in point; and are unwilling where the effect
of the instrument is acknowledged to have beenr ontirely misunderstood by the parties, to say that a Court of equity is
incalable of affording relief.'1(a)

At the trial it was ad-

mitted that the parties to this agreement acted under a mutual mistake as to the lar, neither knowing that this power of
attorney could be revoked by the death of Rousmaniere.

Mr.

Justice Washington in the opinion of the court which he delivered made a very clear and comprehensive statement of the
law of mistake.

fe said, "There are certain principles of

equity, applicable to this question, which, as general priny
ciples we hold to be incontrovertible.

The first is, that

where an instrument is drawn and exeeiuted, which professes,
or is iltended, to carry into execution, an agreement, whether
in Writing or parol, previously entered into, but which by
Mristake of the draug-tsman, elther as to fact or law, does
not fulf ill or which violates the manifest intention of the
parties to the agreement, equity will correct the mistake so
as to produce a conformity of the instrut.ent to the agreement.

The reason is obvious- the - executiont 3f agreements, fairly and legally entered into, ix one of the peoullar branches.
of equity lurisdiction, and If the instrtinont which is intended to execute the agreement, be, from any cause, insufficient for that purpose, the agreement remains as much Umexecuted, as if one of the parties had refused, altogether,
to comply -withhis engagement,-and a Court of Equity will, in
the exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction, afford relief

in the one ease, as well a.

in the other, by compelling the

delinquent party fully to perform his agreement, according to
the terms of it, and to the manifest intentior

of the prtis.

So, if the mistake exist not in the instrument which is

In-,,

tended to give effect to the agreement, but in the agreement
Ltself and An clearly proved to have been tip. result of- ig-.
noranoe of soxe material fact, a Court of Equity will, in
general, grant relief, according to the nature of the lartieular case in which it is sought.
Further on tho learnod Judge continues,

"That the ceneral

intention of the prtios was, to 1 rovide a security as effectual
as a mortgage of the vessel would be canadmit of no doubt,
and if

such had been their ag20,-munt,

the insuffieienoy of

the Instruments to effect that obJect which were afterwards

prepared, would have furnishod a tround for the interposition
of a Court of Equity, which the representitives of Roxsmaniere
could not easily have resisted.

But the plaintiff was not

satisfied to leave the kind of security which he was willing
to receive, undetermined; having finally made up his mind, by
the advice of his counsel, not to accet of a mortgage or

bill of salein nature of a mortgage.

He thought it safedi,

therefore,- to desigzate the Instrument;

and, having deliber-

at ey done so, it met the view of both jartles, and was as
cor4e tely incorporated Into their agreement, as were Ahe
notes of hand for the sia intended to be secured.

In coming

to this agreement It is not pretended that the plaintiff wasmisled by ignorance of any fact, connected with the ageient
vWich he was about to conclude.

If, then, the agreement was

not founded upon a mistake of eny material fact, and it was
executed in strict conformity with itself; we think it

would

be unprecedented, for a Court of Equity to decree another
sec=ity to be given, not only different from that which had
beeh agreed upon, but one which had been deliberately cor-'"
efdered and rejectOd'by t%0 : artio

not arking for relief; or

to treat the case, as if such sther sxOurity had In fact been
agreed upon and executodf

On page 16 of the same case, tho court said, "It
the intention of the Co .rt,

ation to lay it

is not

in the case n6w under consider-

down, t.-At thre

iy

not be cres

in which a

Court of Equity will relieve aEairnt a plain niztake,
from irnorance of law.

arising

But we mean to say, that where the

parties, upon deliberetion and advice, reject one species of
and agree to seleat another,

secrity

umder a misapprehension

of the law as to the nature of the security so selected, the
Court of Equity will not,

on the ground of such misapprehen-

sion, and the insufficiency of such xecurity in consequence
of a subsequent event, not forseen, perhaps, or thought of,
direct a new security, of a different character, to be given,
or decree that to be done which the parties supposed would

havq 'been ef f qtqd,,1 fby ,

VI~ich -was finally agreed
,qZn~txument

rnpqn. "I(a)
In

this second class of oases all courts seem to take the

position held in Hunt v Rousmaniere,

su1ira,

that.parties will

not be relieved from nistakes of law, when they have deliberately chosen one course in 1preforence to anather.

But when

they have not deliberated on their course and agree that a
certain thing shall be done in order to fulj'y carry out their
contract,

having absolntoly no doubt or question as to its

22

being te

pwoper legal aourse

mni

it

subsequently turns out

$?et they have labored nnmler e iirlstakeo, *ourts differ greatly
a

to whether reliof shozdl bo Cranted or not.

